In email system, the cryptography technology has been used to defend email secrets, so it is important to search specific encrypted emails on cloud sever without local decryption. The Public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) might is a suitable way to perform the email ciphertext search. However, most existing PEKS schemes cannot protect the identity privacy of data sender. Deniably authenticated encryption (DAE) technique allows the data sender to deny his/her involvement after the communication. Moreover, the receiver can verify the authenticity of ciphertext in DAE, which assures the identity privacy of data sender. In this paper, so as to solve the above shortages in existing PEKS schemes, we introduce an original scheme called designated server certificateless deniably authenticated encryption with keyword search (dCLDAEKS), where leverages the techniques of DAE and designated server. In dCLDAEKS, data sender authenticates the messages and simultaneously encrypt them. Meanwhile, only designated server has ability to execute search ciphertext operation for receivers. So there is no adversary including the server can launch inside or outside offline KGA. Therefore dCLDAEKS scheme can better protect the identity privacy of data sender. In addition, compared the related schemes in the literature, dCLDAEKS scheme perform less efficient in some procedure, but it can against inside KGA and better protect the sender's identity privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the prosperity development of cloud server, users can store their data in the cloud server and take advantage of its powerful computing ability to execute complicate computation [1] . However, cloud service provider (CSP) might try to read user's emails to discover some privacy information. Therefore, these sensitivity emails should be encrypted before sending to cloud sever to ensure user's privacy. Generally, user may have lots of emails. When user wants to obtain specific email, they should download all of encrypted emails and decrypt all of them. Obviously, this operation is too inefficient.
To solve this problem, Song et al. [2] introduced the symmetric searchable encryption (SSE). In SSE scheme, receiver must negotiate with sender, which cause it unsuitable The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Hongwei Du.
for some specific scenarios (e g. data-sharing). Then Public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) was proposed [3] , which different from SSE schemes [4] , [5] is that data sender can share ciphertext with receiver. Moreover, receiver can give others a trapdoor which contain keyword to authorize them execute search ciphertext operation. However, PEKS exists the risk of exposing the search pattern which means adversary might learn some sensitivity emails from the searching frequency in trapdoor searching history. To solve this issue, Baek et al. [6] introduced designated tester to search encrypted data, in which only the designated tester can execute search ciphertexts operation. Later, many researchers proposed different schemes [7] , [8] with designated tester to hide search pattern.
However, Byun et al. [9] pointed that almost PEKS schemes are vulnerable suffer from the offline keyword guessing attacks (KGA), Which means that adversary can try each possible keyword and encrypt it, then adversary can discover specific keyword contained in the trapdoor by testing encrypted keyword with trapdoor. Due to the chosen space of keyword is small in real world, such attack is feasible. Hence, cloud sever might turn into the inside KGA adversary who can recover sensitive message from some emails.
Lately, Huang and Li [10] proposed public key authenticated encryption with keyword search (PAEKS), where sender authenticates keyword while encrypting it to counter inside KGA attacks.
However, there are three drawbacks in scheme [10] . Firstly, if the outside adversary breaks into cloud server, she/he might acquire the search pattern of user. Secondly, scheme [10] is public key infrastructure (PKI) based, which exists complicated certificate management problem. Some improved identity based solutions [11] also suffer from key escrow problem. Thirdly, almost PAEKS [10] , [11] and its derivative scheme [12] cannot guarantee the identity privacy of the sender.
A. RELATED WORK
In IOT medical, doctors often need some specific data of patients to support their research. They usually need to collect the change of patient's health condition. Hence, the researchers need patient to report their health information truthfully by sending emails. These emails will be stored in the cloud sever. When researchers want to find out some specific symptom, they can search over the related emails and downloads them. Generally, researchers are required to determine the source of the email and verify its validity. However, patients want to protect their privacy, they expect that the research institution can explain to others the authenticity and reliability of the data, but researchers cannot let the third party knows the source of these health information.
To settle these issues, Song et al. [2] first introduced a SSE scheme. But the model of SSE scheme cannot satisfy the need of flexible data sharing. Then Boneh et al. [3] introduced PEKS scheme for the setting of multi user. However, the trapdoor in PEKS must be transmitted via security channel. Then Baek et al. [6] constructed designated tester PEKS scheme (dPEKS), in which only the designated tester has ability to execute the search operation. And Byun et al. [9] found that PEKS schemes exist risk of offline KGA. Since then, researcher [7] , [8] enhanced the ability of resisting offline KGA in scheme [6] . But in schemes [7] , [8] , inside adversary still can launch offline KGA and it also suffer from complicated key escrow problem. To address this problem, Peng et al. [13] first proposed certificateless public key encryption with keyword search (CLPEKS), but it was found existed the risk of offline KGA attacks [14] . Ma et al. [15] , [16] introduced two different CLPEKS tried to counter KGA, but these schemes still existed the risk of inside offline KGA. Lately, Huang and Li [10] pointed that sender authenticated the keyword while encrypting email can resist the inside offline KGA. Then Li et al. [11] proposed designated sever identity based authenticates encryption with keyword search, it reduce the cost of public key certification in his prior work. However, all of the above schemes cannot protect the identity privacy of data sender.
To achieve the goal of protecting sender's identity privacy, researcher found that authentication encryption (AE) combine deniability might is suitable way. Authenticated encryption (AE) can be divided: symmetric authenticated encryption [18] and public key authenticated encryption [17] . In symmetric AE scheme, it's easy to make receiver parties produce the same probability distribution ciphertexts to achieve deniability. However, how to achieve deniability in public key AE scheme is a problem.
To solve this issue, researchers proposed some public key AE scheme [19] , [20] . Moreover, Li et al. [21] first proposed deniably authenticated encryption scheme (DAE) for email system. Later, to reduce the heavy cost of certificate management, Wu and Li [22] proposed identity based deniability authenticated encryption scheme. In 2018, Emmanuel et al. [23] improved the scheme in literature [22] and proposed certificateless deniably authenticated encryption (CLDAE) to avoid the key escrow problem. However, it cannot execute the keyword search operation nor resist offline KGA form inside adversaries.
B. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
We can get from the above, there is no such certificateless PEKS can hide search pattern from outside adversaries and counter inside offline KGA, meanwhile, protecting the identity privacy of data sender. In this paper, we construct a designated server certificateless deniably authenticated encryption with keyword search (dCLDAEKS) scheme. Our contribution is mainly in the following four points: 1) We present the security models for dCLDAEKS, and further we prove that dCLDAEKS not only against inside offline KGA but also assure the indistinguishability of ciphertext and indistinguishability of trapdoor. 2) In dCLDAEKS, only the designated server can execute the search operation which means no adversary can lunch KGA even if it acquires the user's trapdoor. Unless adversary gets the secret key of server. 3) We combine deniably authenticated encryption with PEKS, which make the scheme realize deniability to protect the identity privacy of sender, and it also achieve keyword search function. 4) We compare our scheme with some related schemes in security and computational complexity. Then we demonstrate our scheme's computation efficiency by simulating in JPBC. Although dCLDAEKS is slightly less efficient in some sections performance but it can against inside KGA and better protect the sender's identity privacy.
II. DESIGNATED SERVER CERTIFICATELESS DENIABLY AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION WITH KEYWORD SEARCH
In this section, we show the system model, definition and security model of dCLDAEKS scheme. 
A. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE 1) BILINEAR PAIRING
A map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear if it satisfies the following factors:
(1) Bilinear: e(kP, zP) = e(P, P) kz where k, z ∈ Z * q . (2) Nondegenerate: If P ∈ G 1 , e(P, P) = 1, where 1 is identity element of G 2 . (3) Computable: e(P, P) is efficiently computable for any P ∈ G 1 .
2) DECISIONAL BILINEAR DIFFIE-HELLMAN PROBLEM (DBDH)
Given G 1 and G 2 as groups with order q, P is a generator of G 1 and a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , the DBDH problem is to decide whether Y = e(P, P) kzc or not with (P, kP, zP, cP) and Y ∈ G 2 where k, z, c ∈ Z * q . Let β be a bit such that β = 0 if Y = e(P, P) kzc , and β = 1 if Y is randomly selected from G 2 .
3) COMPUTATIONAL DIFFIE-HELLMAN PROBLEM (CDH)
Given G 1 and G 2 as groups with order q, P is a generator of G 1 , and a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , the CDH problem is to compute kzP with the tuple (P, kP, zP) where k, z ∈ Z * q .
B. SYSTEM MODEL OF dCLDAEKS SCHEME
As show in FIGURE 1, there are four entities in our dCLDAEKS scheme (i) KGC: Key generation center (KGC) can generate the system parameters and sender/receiver's partial private keys. (ii) Data Sender: She/he encrypts his/her email by using traditional encryption (i.e. Enc (M)), moreover she/he extracts keywords from each email and encrypted it. Finally sender uploads the encrypted data to cloud server. (iii) Receiver: She/he can search for specific email interested by sending a trapdoor which contains corresponding keyword to cloud. (iv) Cloud server: Cloud server is a semi-trusted entity which can perform intricate data analysis and computation. After received a trapdoor from the receiver, cloud server searches over the stored ciphertexts by using its own secret key. If it exists, cloud server returns the corresponding encrypted emails to user.
C. DEFINITION OF dCLDAEKS SCHEME
The specific algorithms of dCLDAEKS are as follow:
Given a security parameterk, KGC returns master key s and the public parameter pp.
• D u ← Extract partial private key (pp, s, ID u ): Given public parameter pp, master key s, user's identity ID u , it outputs the partial private key of user D u .
• (PK u , K u ) ← Set public key (pp, ID u ): Given user's identity ID u , user selects secret value x u . Then it outputs user's public key PK u , K u .
Given D u obtained from the KGC and secret value x u , it returns user's private key SK u .
• (SK svr , PK svr ) ← Set server key (pp): Given public parameter pp, it outputs the public key and secret key of server (SK svr , PK svr ).
• CT← dCLDAEKSEnc (pp, w, PK svr , SK s , PK r ): Given public parameterpp, keyword w, sender's private key SK s , server's public key PK svr and receiver's public key PK r , it outputs the ciphertext CT.
• T w ← Trapdoor (pp, w, PK svr , SK r , PK s ): Given public parameter pp, keyword w, receiver's private key SK r , sender's public key PK s and server's public key PK svr , it outputs a trapdoor T w .
• β ← Test (pp, SK svr , CT , T w ) : Given public parameter pp, server's private key SK svr , ciphertext CT and trapdoor T w , if CTand T w contain the same keyword it outputs a bit β = 1 and returns corresponding ciphertext, and 0 otherwise.
• β ← Verify (SK r , CT ): Given public parameterpp, ciphertext CT and receiver's private key SK r , it verify whether the email is sent by data sender. Then it outputs a bit β , if it is, receiver accepts the ciphertext and return β = 1, otherwise it outputs 0 and discard CT .
D. SECURITY MODEL OF dCLDAEKS
We prove that the semantic security of dCLDAEKS against inside offline KGA via the following games between a challenger C and two type adversary A I and A II , where A I can replace the user's public key but cannot access the master key andA II can access the master key but cannot replace any public key.
1) CIPHERTEXT INDISTINGUISHABILITY
We assure our scheme satisfies ciphertext indistinguishability via Game 1 and Game 2. Game 1: This game is interactive between adversary A I and challenger C. 
Game 4:
This game is interactive between adversary A II and challenger C. The procedures of Setup, Phase 1 and Phase 2 are identical to Game 2, except:
-Challenge: A II submits ID * s , ID * r and two challenge keyword (w 0 , w 1 ) to C. C randomly chooses β ∈ {0, 1}, computes corresponding T * β and returns it to A II . -Guess: A II outputs a bit β ∈ {0, 1}, A II wins the game if β = β , ID * r has not been queried for private key and w * 0 , ID * s , ID * r , w * 1 , ID * s , ID * r have not been queried for Trapdoor nor ciphertext, A II wins the game. The advantage of A II wins the game is defined as
3) DENIABLE AUTHENTICATION
We assure our scheme satisfies DA-CMA via Game 5 and Game 6, which include the interactions between two type adversaries F I , F II and the challenger C.
Game 5: This game is interactive between adversary F I and challenger C.
-Setup: C generates the system parameters pp. Then C returns pp to F I . -Attack: F I issues queries which are same with Game 1.
-Forgery: F I outputs a tuple (δ * , ID * s , ID * r , PK * s , PK * r ), if δ * i s valid with ID * s , ID * r and the public keys PK * s , PK * r respectively, F I wins the game. At same time,F I cannot make private key queries, public key replacement and partial private key querieson ID * s , ID * r . Game 6: This game is interactive between adversary F II and challenger C.
-Setup: C generates the system parameters pp and master key s. Then C returns them to F II . -Attack: F II issues queries which are same with Game 2.
-Forgery: F II outputs a tuple (δ * , ID * s , ID * r , PK * s , PK * r ) and F II wins the game under the condition which is similar with Game 5, except that F II is only disallowed to make private key queries.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, a complete dCLDAEKS will be shown.
A. dCLDAEKS SCHEME
As follow, we propose our scheme with following algorithms:
• Setup: Given a security parameter k, KGC randomly selects number s ∈ Z * q as the master key and computes VOLUME 7, 2019 P pub = sP. Finally KGC generates the public parameters pp = (G 1 , G 2 , e, q, P, P pub , H , h, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 ), where G 1 is a cyclic addition group, G 2 is a cyclic multiplicative group, e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear pairing, P is the generator of G 1 and the hash function H :
• Extract partial private key: KGC takes the identity of user as input to generate user's partial private key. Then KGC executes the following steps: 1) Takes the identity ID u of user, KGC computes Q u = H 1 (ID u ). 2) Computes the partial private key D u = sQ u where s is the master key. Finally KGC returns D u to user.
• Set public key: User selects a random number x u ∈ Z * q as his secret value and computes public keys PK u = x u Q u and K u = x u P.
• Set private key: User generates his own private key SK u = (x u , D u )SK u = (x u , D u ) by using the partial private key D u obtained from KGC and the secret value x u selected by himself.
• Set server key: KGC randomly selects t ∈ Z * q , then returns the server's private/public key pair PK svr = tP, SK svr = t.
• dCLDAEKSEnc: Given a keyword w ∈ {0, 1} * , the private key SK s of data sender, receiver's public key PK r , K r and the server's public key PK svr as input.
(1) Sets U = x s K r and computes k = e(D s , PK r ).
(2) Randomly selects r ∈ Z * q and computes X = rQ s , C 1 = e(H (k, U , w), PK svr ) r , C 2 = rK r , C 3 = rH 2 (C 1 , C 2 ).
(3) Computes z = h(w, PK s , PK r , C 1 , U ), V = e((r + z) · D s , Q r ). (4) Returns CT = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , X , V ) as the ciphertext.
• Trapdoor: Takes the receiver's private key SK r and the public key PK s of the sender as input.
(1) Computes k = e(Q s , x r D r ), U = x r K s .
(2) Randomly chooses r ∈ Z * q , computes T 1 = r P and T 2 = 1
x r H 3 (r PK svr )H (k, U , w). (3) Returns T w = (T 1 , T 2 ) as the Trapdoor.
• Test: Takes the server's private key, ciphertext CT and trapdoor T w as input. Sever parses CT as (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) and T w as (T 1 , T 2 ), then it computes
Finally, cloud server returns corresponding ciphertext if equation (1) and (2) holds, otherwise 0. e(C 2 , H 2 (C 1 , C 2 )) = e(K r , C 3 )
• Verify: Takes the private key of receiver SK r and ciphertext CT.
Data receiver verifies whether V = e(X +zQ s , D r ) holds. If it holds, receiver accepts the ciphertext, otherwise outputs 0.
B. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS
We set the trapdoor of keyword w as T w , w is the keyword included in ciphertext CT. Only when w = w, can we compute the following equation holds.
The legal data receiver can use his own private key to generate a ciphertext which is indistinguishable from the ciphertext generated by data sender. The simulation include the following steps:
(1) Computes U = x r K s and k = e(X s , x r D r ).
(2) Given keyword w, it randomly selects r ∈ Z * q and computes X = r Q s , C 1 = e(H (k , U , w), PK svr ) r , C 2 = r K r , C 3 = rH 2 (C 1 , C 2 ).
(3) Computes z = h(w, PK s , PK r , C 1 , U ) and V = e(X +z Q s , D r ). (4) Computes CT = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , X , V ). The ciphertext CT generated by receiver is indistinguishable from CT of the sender produces in dCLDAEKSEnc algorithm. Due to the ciphertext CT generated by the random value r ∈ Z * q , the probability of ciphertext CT = CT is
Therefore, we can say that the ciphertext CT has the same distributions of probability with CT .
IV. PROVABLE SECURITY
In this section, we prove ourdCLDAEKS scheme can against inside KGA of Type I adversary A I and Type II adversary A II . Furthermore we also prove that our scheme satisfies ciphertext indistinguishability and trapdoor indistinguishability and deniable, if DBDH assumption and CDH assumption holds.
A. CIPHERTEXT INDISTINGGUISHABILITY
Lemma 1: We suppose that there exists a PPT adversary A I who can win Game 1 with advantage ε under the condition that A I queries the random oracles h, H i (where i = 1, 2) for most q h , q H , q H i . Then we can construct an algorithm C to solve the DBDH problem with an advantage:
Proof: Suppose A I has ability to break the security of dCLDAEKS, then C can use A I to determine the answer of the DBDH problem by following steps:
Setup: C randomly selects t ∈ Z * q , and sets pp = (G 1 , G 2 , e, q, P, P pub = cP) and the server's private/public key pair (t, tP). Then, C keeps record lists L h , L i (where i = 1, 2) . Moreover, C maintains list L 3 which contains the output of private keys and public keys.
Phase 1: A I adaptively issues queries to C as follows: -H queries: Given k ∈ G 2 , U ∈ G 1 and a keyword w, it randomly selects an element from G 1 , then returns it as the reply of H (k, U , w) . 
-Private key queries: A I queries identity ID i . If the public key about ID i has not been replaced and ID i = ID y , then C checks the list L 3 and replies A I with SK i = (x i , D i ), If id-entity ID i = ID y or the public key about ID i has been replaced, then C terminates. -Replace public key queries: A I can replaces ID i 's public keys (PK i , K i ) with valid values PK i and K i . Then C updates L 3 with (ID i , D i , PK i , K i , ⊥). -Ciphertext queries: A I queries on tuple (ID s , ID r , w), C first consults the public key queries to obtain public keys of ID s and ID r . Then it retrieves sender's private key from L 3 . C randomly selects r ∈ Z * q , and returns the ciphertext as follow: If (ID s , ID r ) = (ID η , ID γ ) or (ID r , ID s ) = (ID η , ID γ ), C computes X = rP, C 1 = e(H (Z , U , w) , PK svr ) r , C 2 = rK r , C 3 = rH 2 (C 1 , C 2 ), V = rP pub .
Otherwise, it retrieves D s from L 3 , then computes k = e(cP, aK r ) b i and returns X = rQ s , C 1 = e (H (k, U , w) , PK svr ) r , C 2 = rK r , C 3 = rH 2 (C 1 , C 2 ), V = e((r + z)D s , X r ) -Trapdoor queries: A I queries on tuple (ID s , ID r , w), C first consults the public key queries to obtain public keys of ID s and ID r . Then it retrieves receiver's private key from L 3 . C randomly selects r ∈ Z * q and returns the trapdoor as follow: If ID s = ID y , it computes T 1 = r P, T 2 =1/x r · H 3 (r PK svr ) · H (Z , U , w). Otherwise it retrieves D r , x r from L 3 , then computes k = e(H (ID s ), x r aP) b i and returns T 1 = r P, T 2 =1/x r · H 3 (r PK svr )H (k , U , w).
Challenge: A I queries on two keywords w * 0 , w * 1 with two identities ID * s , ID * r which it expects to be challenged. C randomly chooses a bitβ ∈ {0, 1}, an number r * ∈ Z * q and returns the ciphertext
Phase 2: A I can adaptively issue queries similar to Phase 1.
Guess: A I outputs a bit β ∈ {0, 1}. C outputs β = 0, if β = β. Otherwise it outputs 1.
Analysis: C would abort Game 1 if challenge identity is ID η , ID y (E 1 denotes this event). The probability that E 1 does not happen is 1 q H 1 (q H 1 −1) . Suppose that C does not abort, if Z = e(P, P) abc . Then the probability that A I would win the game is Adv C A 1 (λ) + 1/2. If Z is randomly selected from G 2 , then k = H (Z , U , w β ) is also random element of G 2 . Hence, C can solves the DBDH problem with an advantage:
However, Adv C A I (λ) is non-negligible. So Adv DBDH C (λ) is non-negligible.
Lemma 2: We suppose that there exists PPT adversary A II who can wins Game 2 with advantage ε under the condition that A II queries the random oracles h, H, H i (where i = 1, 2) for most q h , q H , q H i . VOLUME 7, 2019 Then C can solve the CDH problem with an advantage:
Proof: Suppose A II has ability to break the security of proposed scheme, then C can use A II to solve the CDH problem by interacting with A II as follows:
Setup: C randomly selects t ∈ Z * q , and sets pp = (G 1 , G 2 G 2 , e, q, P, P pub = sP) and the server's private/public key pair (t, tP). Then, C keeps records L h and L i (where i = 1, 2). Moreover, C maintains list L 3 which contains the output of private keys and public keys. 
-H 2 queries: Given (C 1 , C 2 ), C randomly picks δ ∈ Z * q , returns H 2 (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) = δaP to A II , and adds the tuple (C 1 , C 2 ), H 2 (C 1 , C 2 ), δ into L 2 .
-Public key queries: Upon received A II 's query on ID i , C first checks whether L 3 contains (ID i , D i , PK i , K i , x i ).
If it exists, C responses A II with (PK i , K i ). Else C randomly picks x i ∈ Z * q . If ID i = ID γ , C replies with K γ = x i aP, PK γ = x i aQ γ and if ID i = ID η , C replies with K η = x i bP, PK η = x i bQ η . If ID i = ID γ , ID η , then C returns K i = x i P and PK i = x i b i P then updates L 3 with (ID i , PK i , K i , x i ).
-Private key queries: A II queries C with identity ID i .
C checks the list L 3 and replies A II with SK i = (x i , D i ).
If ID i = ID y and ID i = ID η , C terminates. C randomly selects r ∈ Z * q , and returns the trapdoor as follow: -If ID r = ID y , ID η , it computes T 1 = r P, T 2 = 1/x r · H 3 (r PK svr )H (k, x 2 i abP, w). Otherwise C retrieves D r , x r from L 3 , then C runs the Trapdoor algorithm to reply A II .
-Challenge: A II queries on two keywords w * 0 and w * 1 with two challenged identities ID * s and ID * r . C randomly chooses a bit β ∈ {0, 1}, r ∈ Z * q , sets K * r = x i bP, then C randomly chooses k ∈ G 2 and an random element from G 2 as the value of H (k, U , w β ), finally returns the ciphertext, where 
Here we omit the detail of proof process.
Lemma 4: For type II adversary A II , we can also prove that dCLDAEKS satisfies trapdoor indistinguishability via CDH assumption. The proof is identical with Lemma 2, expect that C generates the challenge trapdoor as T β = (T 1 , T 2 ) where T 1 = r * P, T 2 =1/x r · H 3 (r * PK svr ) · H (k, U , w β ), r * ∈ Z * q is randomly selected by C. Here we omit the detail of process.
C. DENIABLE AUTHENTICATION
In the random oracle model, we can prove that our dCLDAEKS scheme is DA-CMA secure. The scheme can against two type adversary F I and adversaryF II , if DBDH and CDH problem holds.
Lemma 5: The proof is similar with the section of deniable authentication in literature [17] , except that δ 2 = V in our scheme.
Lemma 6: The proof is similar with section of the deniable authentication in literature [17] , except that in Forgery phase of our scheme, F II can produces a ciphertext δ * = (X * , C * 1 , C * 2 , C * 3 , V * ). Only when F II queries for hash value H (k * , U * = x 2 i abP, w * ), canF II discern that δ * is an invalid ciphertext. So we have e(P, x 2 i U * ) = e(K s , K r ) = e(x i aP, x i bP) = e(P, x 2 i abP). Hence, C can successfully compute U * = abP. Analysis process is identical to the description in Lemma 2.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We carry out our scheme using JPBC in a personal computer with i5-2400 3.10GHZ processor, 4GB memory, and Windows 10 operating system. FIGURE. 2 and FIGURE. 3 respectively demonstrate the running time of keyword encryption and Trapdoor algorithms of dCLDAEKS as the number of keywords increases. FIGURE. 4 demonstrates the running time of Test algorithm of dCLDAEKS as the number of ciphertexts increases. Moreover we compare our scheme with related schemes [10] , [11] , [24] in terms of security and computation efficient. From TABLE 2, we can get the information that scheme [10] can only resist outside and inside offline KGA, but it does not satisfy the deniability and it without designated tester. Scheme [24] needs transmitted via secure channel and it only resist outside KGA. Although scheme [11] avoids some above problems, but it does not satisfy deniability and suffer key escrow issue. In computation performance, dCLDAEKS is slightly less computationally efficient with the related schemes, but it is still competitive. Because dCLDAEKS scheme provides better sender's privacy protection and stronger security. 
A. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON

VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we construct designated server certificateless deniably authenticated encryption with keyword search (dCLDAEKS). Moreover, we prove that our scheme is secure against inside offline KGA of two type adversary. Meanwhile, dCLDAEKS scheme can satisfies ciphertext indistinguishability and trapdoor indistinguishability. In protecting user identity privacy, we combine denial authentication technology to achieve the goal of protecting data sender identity privacy. In addition, we adopt the method of designated tester to execute ciphertext searching operation, which further ensures that no adversary can launch offline KGA in our scheme. All in all, though dCLDAEKS scheme perform less efficient in some procedure, but it can provide better sender's privacy protection and stronger security.
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